Abstract. One view regarding auction duration suggests that longer auctions would result in more bidders and more bids, which in turn would result in higher prices. An opposing view is that shorter auctions might appeal to impatient bidders, or alternatively that shorter duration might lead to more competitive dynamics. To examine these competing notions, we conduct pairwise comparisons of simultaneous auctions identical in all but duration. The auctions are conducted on two different platforms-eBay and a local auction site. We find that in eBay auctions, longer duration increases the number of bidders and bids and consequently increases final prices by about 11%. In the local auction website with far fewer auctions and a more steady set of participants, the effect is reversed and shorter auctions generate higher prices by about 20%. Both sets of effects are robust and significant. We look at bidding activity on both sites to try to get at the root of that reversal. We find that in eBay auctions, the higher price in the longer duration auction is accompanied by a higher number of participating bidders and a higher number of bids placed in the auction. In the local site, we find that the auction duration does not significantly affect the number of participating bidders or the number of bids placed in an auction. However, the magnitude of jump bids is negatively and significantly correlated with duration. These jump bids are in turn shown to impact final prices.
Introduction
One important feature of online auctions is participation by a geographically dispersed population of bidders over a period of several days. This has made auction duration a particularly salient attribute. While a traditional off-line auction may last several minutes or even seconds, most online auctions run over several days. On eBay, sellers can choose between duration of 1, 3, 5, 7 or 10 days. For sellers, the selection of specific auction durations may have a significant impact on profitability.
It has been proposed that longer auctions attract more bidders (Cox, 2005) . In general, if bidders' arrival time at the auction site is a random variable-bidders visit at different timesthen longer auctions would be seen by more bidders and more bidders would participate. More bidders should in turn lead to higher selling prices (e.g. Bulow and Klemperer 1996) . It has also been proposed that a larger number of bidders may result in herd behavior resulting in higher prices (Dholakia, Basuroy and Soltysinski, 2002) 1 . Empirically, Cox (2005) finds that longer auctions result in significantly higher prices. In contrast, Ariely and Simonson (2003) find that shorter duration auctions result in higher prices.
While longer auctions are typically expected to draw more bidders, there are several reasons offered for a higher premium in shorter auctions. The first is impatience (Matthews, 2004; Isaac, Salmon and Zillante, 2007; Kwasnica and Katok, 2007; Katok and Kwasnica, 2008; Wang et al., 2008) 2 . Impatience has implications for jump bidding-defined as bidding in increments greater than the minimum increment. Jump bidding is a commonly observed 1 Specifically, they found that bidders gravitate toward listings with existing bids, while demonstrating no consideration for listings without any existing bids. 2 Kwasnica and Katok (2007) systematically vary in the laboratory the opportunity costs associated with fast bidding. They find that when time is more valuable (bidders are more impatient) bidders respond by choosing larger jump bids. Katok and Kwasnica (2008) showed that revenue in fast Dutch auctions is lower than slow Dutch auction and attributed the difference to impatience.
phenomenon in many auction settings, ranging from standalone consumer auctions to multiple unit auctions, including FCC and 3G spectrum auctions (Isaac, Salmon and Zillante, 2007) . Kwasnica and Katok (2007) showed that when bidders are impatient-the opportunity cost of time is higher in one experimental manipulation in that study--bidders respond by choosing larger jump bids. Kwasnica and Katok noted that revenue would be expected to decline with high jump bids due to poorer allocative efficiency 3 . That argument, however, holds for standalone auctions. In competitive auctions, the opposite is the case. Jump bidding implies that a bidder may find himself committed to a higher price than he could otherwise obtain in competing simultaneous auctions. Revenue for the auction is expected to increase.
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A second argument is increased bidding activity as a result of excitement or competitive arousal in shorter auctions, also known as frenzy (Ariely and Simonson, 2003, Häubl and Popkowski Leszczyc, 2003) . Frenzy refers to a mental state induced by the dynamic interaction among bidders in an ascending bid auction and characterized by a high level of excitement, a strong sense of competition, and an intense desire to win (Häubl and Popkowski Leszczyc, 2003) . Jank et al (2008, and see Dass et al., 2009 ) examine models to predict the price of an auction in progress (intermediate price rather than final price). They measure competition between pairs of bidders in simultaneous auctions, both within the same auction as well as across different simultaneous auctions, and allow for competition as an explanatory variable. They find 3 However, the economic performance of auctions in their finding was not significantly affected by the value of time. 4 A caveat to using the jump bidding argument here is the proxy bidding feature of eBay and the local auction site (which is modeled after eBay). This feature changes the nature jump bidding. Bidders can enter bids only as "maximum bids" and the computer still bids incrementally on bidders' behalf up to their maximum bids. Jump bids are still observed-a maximum bid which is higher than the maximum bid stated by the currently highest bidder will automatically jump to the previously highest maximum bid, resulting in a jump bid. However, the observed jump bid increments are different from what we call jump bid increments-which is the difference between one's "maximum bid" and the currently showing highest bid. In short, jump bidding is best studied in settings without the proxy feature, but this is often not possible when studying eBay auctions.
that competition reduces the need to include price velocity (speed of price increases) as an explanatory variable, suggesting that bidder competition may be a major source of the dynamics, consistent with notions of competitive arousal.
Another view on the relationship between auction duration and the final price is offered in Bapna et al. (2008) who find that longer auctions can negatively affect the price dynamics because of a "bidding draught" which typically occurs in the middle of the auction.
In this work, we conduct field experiments on auctions of different durations. In these field experiments, bidders arrive at auction web sites for the purpose of purchasing, or attempting to purchase, an item. The availability of data on eBay has prompted many researchers to collect bidding data and analyze it and it is not uncommon for researchers to be actively involved on the seller side of the auction for the purpose of greater control. One innovation here is that we run pairs of auctions simultaneously as well as sequentially. Therefore, we have two auctions competing with one another. As such, we are able to not only say which auction results in a better price but also when one auction draws more bidders, that auction can be said to be "preferred" in a way to the other auction running simultaneously. The simultaneous pair design also permits us to fully control for temporal effects that are taking place at that time of day, the week, the month or the year. We compare auctions of different durations by pitting a short duration auction lasting one day against a longer duration auction which ends at the exact same time. This allows us to tease out the competing explanations listed above (see Haruvy et al., 2008 for an overview of research involving competing auctions).
We examine two auction platforms. The first is eBay, where millions of bidders gather and bid. The advantage of eBay is that it is a well known platform with direct consequences for many sellers. However, we have no control over the time at which the buyer pays and obtains the item or over the set of bidders exposed to the auction. In addition to eBay, we examine a local website with approximately 4,000 registered users. These users are notified at the same time regarding upcoming auctions, and these auctions take place over a pre-specified limited duration.
Hence, the set of bidders and their arrival times are less spread out and their attention to auctions is focused on a limited number of auctions. It is therefore reasonable to expect (as we will shortly confirm) that the number of bidders will not vary greatly for auctions of different durations. This allows us to isolate the bidder entry effect from the other two explanations discussed earlier.
Experiments

eBay Platform
The experimental design involves pairs of identical items sold simultaneously in eBay auctions. The seller is the same for the pair of items and is one of two seller identities we used for this study. Both identities had a large number of ratings, where these ratings are the number of feedback responses by unique buyers (seller ratings in the 500's and 600's, respectively); of these ratings, only one feedback was negative for the first seller. There were zero negative feedbacks for the second seller.
The two auctions in pair always had the same ending time. The picture and description of the items was the same in both auctions.
Between conditions, we vary duration in 17 pairs of auctions (experimental pairs). The duration was 1 day for one auction in the pair and 3 days for the other auction in a pair. As a control, in 241 auction pairs (control pairs), we do not vary the duration between the two auctions. They are 3 days in both auctions in the pair. No control treatment is available for the one day auctions. For the present analysis, to be described shortly, it seems that one control treatment suffices. 
The Secret audio book (4 auctions).
Local Internet Auction Site
Auctions were conducted on a local Internet auction site that uses a similar format as eBay, structured as English ascending bid auctions with fixed ending times. We had complete control over both the layout of the website and the content of the items on the website for the duration of the study. The main auction page featured all available items. In addition, the use of the local website allows us to control for confounding variables, including different auctioneers, and competition, reserve prices and auction descriptions. Registered users of this auction website were residents of a major North American city. At the time of the study, the auction site had over 4,000 registered users. Registered users received an e-mail notification of the upcoming auctions. In addition the event was locally advertised, through posters and newspaper advertisements.
Each auction includes a product description, a picture, and a starting bid of $0.01.
Products are sold through an established seller with over 200 feedback ratings. Data are collected on the ending prices, and the complete bidding history of all auctions, including proxy and nonproxy bids. The bid history includes the timing, the bid amount and the bidder ID of each bid placed in an auction. Wining bidders collected and paid for their items at a local retail outlet. To rule out a possible incentive for time sensitive or impatient bidders to bid in shorter duration auctions, bidders were informed that items would only be available for pick-up after all auctions (in a batch) are completed. Auctions did not have a buy-it-now option, so bidders could not use such an option to avoid longer auctions.
A simple design was used where items were sold sequentially either in one-day or ten-day durations. The study was conducted in two batches (distinct time periods) where each of the items was sold in both a one day and a ten-day auction. Within each batch, half of the products were randomly selected to be sold first in a one-day auction, followed by a ten-day auction; the other half of products are first sold through a ten-day auction, followed by a one-day auction. In this way we kept the day of the week and the number of auctions ending on a day balanced across conditions. Each auction started at 9pm in the evening and ended one or ten days later at 8pm in the evening. In total, 164 different unique items were sold in this pair-wise design, for a total of 328 auctions. The auctions were run over a period of two months. The items included electronics, computer products, musical CD's, and household items. In many cases, bidders placed bids in multiple auctions. There were 148 instances of bidders placing bids in both auctions for a given item.
Differences between the two studies
With field experiments, there is far less control of external factors relative to laboratory experiments. Every potential confound controlled for in the design may result in another. The researcher's goal, in some sense, is to make acceptable tradeoffs.
The two studies we ran involved different complications and therefore different experimental design considerations. The main experimental concern on eBay is the large number of auctions which could be considered substitutes to the ones being designed by the researcher.
For Harry Potter books in particular, there were several auctions running concurrently with ours, although none with the same ending times. It was therefore important to take several precautions.
One was to make the design pairwise (simultaneous pairs), so that whatever else is happening on the eBay site is comparable between the two auctions in a pair. Another was to choose products carefully. Virtually all the baby products we list had nearly zero auctions running in parallel to ours.
With the local Internet auction site, the design considerations were almost opposite to those on eBay. The auction site had thousands of registered active users as opposed to the millions of bidders on eBay, so a sequential auction design made more sense. There were no competing substitutes on the auction platform (there are always substitutes outside of the platform but this is one of the acceptable confounds that has no good solution) and so all we had to control for was the temporal aspect which we handled by varying the order of the short and long auctions. The choice of products was likewise different in that on the one hand, we did not have to choose our products by worrying about substitutes, but on the other hand, our smaller market could not absorb too many repetitions of the same product, so greater diversity of products was needed.
Second, the duration decisions were driven by the norms on each site. Therefore, the durations themselves are not perfectly comparable. On eBay, the comparison was between 1 and 3 days. On the local auction site, it was between 1 and 10 days. These different durations do not allows us to test nor rule out theories of non-monotonic effects of duration on price, such as price increasing in duration from 1 to 3 days, but decreasing from 3 to 10 days.
Due to these opposing considerations, the studies are not directly comparable. In addition to the experimental design differences, there are obvious platform and bidder base differences that make this comparison difficult to make. Hence, instead of looking at the two studies as experimental treatments of the same construct, one should look at them as two separate investigations of the effect of duration on prices in two auction platforms. We find diametrically opposite effects in the two platforms and our empirical analysis sheds some light on why these different results occur.
Results for eBay auctions
Summary statistics for both studies are provided in Table 1 . For each experimental condition, the table displays the average number of bids entered, average number of bidders, and average selling price. Note that the eBay data comes from sets of two simultaneous auctions with identical ending times but different durations.
----------------------------------Insert Table 1 about here ----------------------------------
On average bidders in the one-day eBay auctions paid $21.49 versus $23.93 in three-day eBay auctions, for identical items, sold by identical sellers, in pairs of auctions that ran simultaneously and ended at exactly the same time. On average, the price difference between the two conditions in Table 1 is $2.44. Looking at the difference between prices over all items, one day auctions result in approximately 11% decrease in the average price compared to their longer counterparts. This was significant in a pair-wise t-test, with a p-value of 0.001. Number of bidders and number of bids are higher for longer durations. While not significantly higher in the pairwise t-test over 17 paired observations, for the full sample the p-values are 0.04 and 0.08 for number of bids and number of bidders, respectively. Hence, we conclude that there are more bids and higher prices in longer duration auctions on eBay.
We next examine three simple linear regressions. In all regressions, we have a product dummy variable to control for product effects. First we show that duration has a significant direct effect on selling price (β = 2.47, p = 0.01). We next show that the number of bidders affects selling prices as well (β = 0.75, p = 0.02). Finally we estimate a model which has price as the dependent variable and both duration (β 1 = 2.03, p = 0.04) and number of bidders (β 2 = 0.59, p = 0.05) as explanatory variables. The reduction in duration's effect on price when the number of bidders is included as an explanatory variable implies partial mediation, but not complete mediation (this would happen if duration was no longer significant following the addition of the bidder variable).
We also conducted a similar test for the number of bids. While the results are similar to the results for the number of bidders, the mediated model shows that the number of bids is more of a mediator than the number of bidders, as the coefficient for duration is lower and only marginally significant in the mediated model (β = 0.682, p = .06).
5 Hence, both the number of bidders and the number of bids mediate the effect of duration on selling price, but only partially.
Bidding Activity. Bidders on eBay submit bids in a box titled "Maximum Bid." When the Maximum Bid entered by a bidder is greater than one bidding increment above the highest currently shown bid, then the eBay proxy mechanism will bid up the price incrementally to one's Maximum Bid. In a standalone auction, whether bidders bid incrementally or report their true valuations, theoretically there should not be a difference in final price. However, when there are multiple auctions, competition between auctions might be reduced if bidders entered their true valuations (as eBay recommends) and did not shop around for the best price. We examine the extent to which bidders bid incrementally by measuring the average jump. A jump is defined as the difference between the Maximum Bid entered and the currently shown highest bid. The average jump is $4.59 in the short duration auctions versus $4.51 in the longer duration auctions.
This difference is not significant (p-value = 0.86). Hence, the difference in final prices between short and long durations does not appear to be caused by more aggressive bidding in one auction duration versus another.
Together these results show that selling prices are higher in longer auctions, which is in part due to increased bidding activity (i.e., a greater number of bidders and bids). However, this increased competition does not appear to result in more aggressive bidding in longer auctions.
Results for the local auction Site.
Summary statistics for the local auction site are provided in Table 1 . For each treatment, table 1 displays the average number of bids displayed, average number of bid entries, average number of bidders, and average selling price.
First, we note the effect of duration on final prices. On average bidders in the one-day auctions paid $20.17 versus $17.29 in ten-day auctions, for identical items. Hence, looking at the difference between prices over all items, one day auctions result in a 16.6% increase in the average price over their longer counterparts. A possibly more informative statistic is the average percentage difference over items. 6 The average percentage difference is 20.6%. This difference is highly significant (t = 2.5, df = 163, p =.014). In contrast to the eBay study, shorter auctions here attracted slightly more bidders, although, this difference is not statistically significant (t = 1.02, df = 163, p =.31). Similarly the difference in the number of bids was not statistically significant (t = 0.47, df = 163, p =.64). Looking at the specific product categories we can see that for half of the product categories shorter auctions resulted in significantly higher selling prices, and in none of the cases did longer auctions lead to higher selling prices. The product categories for which we did find a significant effect of duration included in particular items that tended to be more difficult to assess the value (e.g. collectables, handicrafts, jewellery, household and certain computer items). Finally, since the jump bids are different between durations, it is interesting to see whether we can observe a relationship between the magnitude of the jump bids and final prices.
The regression below shows that when one accounts for the average jump in an auction, the duration is no longer a significant explanatory variable in predicting final price. That is, the effect of duration on final price is entirely mediated by the average magnitude of jump bids in the auction.
- Table 2 about here ----------------------------------
Conclusion
The empirical evidence in the literature has been mixed in regards to the effect of duration on price. Typically in regressions on eBay data, the effect of duration on final price comes out positive. However, this effect is also typically accompanied by more bidders and consequently more bids, so the net effect of duration on price is ambiguous. 7 In past results from laboratory experiments, where the number of bidders can typically be controlled, the evidence seems to indicate that shorter auctions may result in higher prices.
In order to examine the desirability of auction duration for bidders with the maximum control possible, we ran short auctions paired with longer auctions. We ran such experiments on two platforms -eBay and a local auction site which has a more stable set of bidders. As expected, longer auctions on eBay resulted in more bidders and more bids, and this was accompanied by higher prices in the longer eBay auctions. On the local auction site, the number of bidders and bids was roughly comparable between auction durations. This is particularly remarkable in light of the fact that the auction pairs on eBay were much closer in duration to one another than in the local auction site (the eBay auctions were 1 day vs. 3 days, whereas the local auctions were 1 day vs. 10 days). Results of mediation analyses indicated that at least some of the positive effect of duration on price can be attributable to the number of bidders that such auctions draw on eBay, where bidder arrival time is spread out over time. In contrast, in the local auction site with pre-announced auctions running for a limited time, the number of bidders is steadier and there is no effect of duration on the number of bidders. In that setting, the positive effect of duration is evident.
One explanation for higher price in shorter duration auctions on the local auction site is impatience. To rule out time discounting, bidders in the local auction experiment were informed that items would only be available for pick-up after all auctions in a batch were completed.
Moreover, auctions on the local site did not have a buy-it-now option, so bidders could not use such an option to avoid longer auctions. These controls are imperfect. Uncertainty in itself may have a disutility associated with it, and we cannot rule out impatience as a factor in the current result. The higher jump bidding we observed in the shorter auctions on the local auction site is consistent with Kwasnica and Katok's (2007) prediction of what impatient bidders would do.
Hence, to the extent that shorter auctions draw more impatient bidders, our results are consistent with the argument by Kwasnica and Katok (2007) and indicative of impatience as a factor.
Another argument for higher prices in shorter auctions is that shorter auctions might lead to more intensive bidding and a potential state of competitive arousal (bidding frenzy). Different measures have been proposed in the literature, which generally involve the number of bids, number of bidders and bids submitted per bidder (Dholakia and Simonson, 2005) and the intensity of bidding -i.e., the speed of competitive reaction (Häubl and Popkowski Leszczyc, 2003) . None of these measures were found to be significantly different across auction durations. Kwasnica and Katok (2007) argued that jump bidding would result in lower revenues in a standalone auction due to poorer allocative efficiency. In competitive auctions, jump bidding has a different implication-a jump bidder can overpay in one auction relative to what he could obtain in another. In regression analysis, we find that jump bids, as opposed to other factors, are directly responsible for the difference in final prices 8 .
In summary, duration is consequential, but the direction of duration's impact on final prices critically depends on both the arrival process of bidders and the opportunity cost of time for the bidders. In this investigation, we provided intriguing empirical evidence suggestive of these opposing effects of duration. A new set of theories is needed to account for both bidder entry and the bigger jump bids in shorter duration auctions. 8 One might argue that higher jump bids may simply be correlated with higher valuations. In the local auction site, where jump bids are observed, we obtained the maximum bids (presumably willingness to pay) for all bidders, including the winner. There was no significant difference in average willingness to pay between short and long auctions. 
